''''* langacker [#ka620651]

72 Nouns and verbs
the alphabet.
For the instantiation of a count-noun category, incrementation is achieved by the addition of discrete instances. I refer to this Ρτούτιν as replicability; its linguistic reflexes include countability and pluralization." The bounding of count nouns, whether achieved through internal configuration or contrast with surroundings, is responsible for their replicability: because there is some limit to the set of interconnected entities constituting the designated region, there is a point at which one instance of the category is exhausted, so that further incrementation results in the initiation of another instance. Mass nouns are nonreplicable (do not pluralize) because there is no such limit, i.e. they are indefinitely expansible. Incrementing a valid instance of a mass-noun category does not serve to initiate a second, distinct instance, but simply to make the first instance larger. Thus we speak of more sand but another hammer. Note also the water in those two lakes, where water remains singular when lake undergoes replication.
The relatedness of the four distinguishing properties should now be apparent. Bounding prevents indefinite expansion, and also contraction (since the boundary itself is necessary to an instance of a count-noun category). Heterogeneity forecloses the possibility of any subpart being equivalent to any other, and thus rules out expansibility/contractibility. Heterogeneity can itself be crucial to bounding; even in cases like spot, which shows internal homogeneity, the line of contrast that delimits the boundary can be regarded as introducing a measure of heterogeneity. Finally, replicability depends on bounding, and is incompatible with indefinite expansibility.
Supporting the definitions in (2) are nouns of dual categorization which differ in semantic value according to their count- or mass-noun status. The mass noun rock, for instance, names a substance of indefinite expanse, while a rock designates a discrete, bounded object composed of this substance. Other examples of this type include brick, stone, fur, hide, glass, cloth, rope, wire, diamond, cake, meatloaf, steak, and so on. Tile is particularly instructive, having three common values: (i) as the name of an undifferentiated substance, it functions as a mass noun; (ii) as a count noun, it designates a relatively small, discrete object composed of that Substance, and (iii) by putting together a large number of such objects, we obtain a material of indefinite expanse that is also called tile in a mass-noun use. Since each sense presupposes and incorporates the one that precedes, I will say that they represent different 'levels of conceptual organization'. Our capacity for entertaining conceptions involving multiple levels of organization will be crucial in later discussion.
Given proper circumstances, almost any count noun can be construed as designating a homogeneous, unbounded mass and thereby come to function as a mass noun grammatically. Consider these examples:
Count vs. mass nouns 73
(4) a. After I ran over the cat with our car, there was cat all over the driveway.
b. I don't like shelf.-I'd rather eat table. c. When he finished using his knife to tunnel through the stone wall, it had
very little blade left.
In (4a), the unfortunate cat loses its structural integrity through the accident, being converted into an effectively homogeneous substance. (Though a single cat will yield only a limited quantity of this substance, the internal properties of the mass do not impose any inherent limit on its potential expanse.) Example (4b), it has been noted, would be conceivable if uttered by one intelligent termite to another. Here the mass-noun status of shelf and table reflects both function and scope of predication. For purposes of consumption, the overall configuration of a shelf or a table is less important than the qualitative properties of the substance comprising it. Moreover, a termite is so small relative to such objects that their boundaries can be expected to fall outside the scope of predication, if this latter is adjusted to the typical scale of termite experience. Finally, (4c) is less concerned with the blade as an integral, functional whole than with its diminishing size. In effect its spatial expanse is construed as a quantifiable substance.
Also compatible with (2) is a familiar pattern whereby the mass-noun term for a beverage is employed as a count noun designating a limited quantity (single serving) of that beverage: I'll have a {beer/whisky/ginger ale/gin and tonic). Another familiar pattern of extension permits the term for a substance to function as a count noun indicating a particular type or brand of that substance: a fine wine; a hard steel; a good glue, a tasty beer. This second pattern merits closer Scrutiny, since the count-noun status of such examples does not reflect the imposition of any quantitative limits or spatial bounding. The present framework nevertheless affords a natural and revealing analysis.
A term like wine, which designates a physical substance, obviously requires numerous domains for its semantic characterization. Its primary domain is space --note that quantifying expressions (some, a lot of, more, etc.) pertain to its physical volume. Wine is categorized as a mass noun, then, because the designated substance is indefinitely expansible (hence unbounded) in this domain. To be sure, a substance like wine is bounded in the sense of being distinguished from other kinds of substances. It is convenient in this regard to speak of "quality space', defined as those domains responsible for the qualitative differentiation of one substance from another. In the case of liquids, for example, the domains of quality space include such parameters as viscosity, color, degree of transparency, dimensions pertaining to taste and smell, etc. The notion of quality space is schematized in Figure 2(a). Only three parameters are explicitly indicated, labeled Pl, P2 and P. A particular type of substance, such as wine, is limited to a certain range of values along each parameter, given here as W. W2. and W Collectively these values define a bounded region W in quality space that characterizes the permissible range of variation for the category and sets it apart


74 Nouns and verbs
from other substances.

Figure 2.
A substance term like wine, in its basic mass-noun Sense, therefore manifests a disparity between its primary domain (physical space) and the set of domains for which intrinsic bounding can be posited (quality space). Given this description, how can we characterize the semantic extension giving rise to the count-noun sense wherein wine means something akin to 'brand/type of wine'. Two factors figure in this extension. First, there is a reranking of domains; because the extended sense focuses on qualitative concerns, it is reasonably described as elevating quality space to the status of primary domain.' Second, there is a shift in profiling and scope of predication, as sketched in Figure 2(b). The region W profiled by wine in its basic Sense is adopted as the immediate scope of predication for its extended value. The profile is an arbitrary bounded region W that is properly included within this immediate scope W. The resulting sense of wine designates a bounded region within the scope of predication in the primary domain, making it a count noun in accordance with (2a). Moreover, since W is arbitrarily chosen, there are many subregions of W that might be intended as the designatum on a given occasion (i.e. there are many possible types or brands of wine). Since W is not unique, wine in this count-noun Sense is a common rather than a proper noun and behaves accordingly (e.g. it pluralizes and occurs with determiners).

6. Relations
Most broadly, the meanings of linguistic expressions divide themselves into 'nominal' vs. 'relational’’ predications. These two types do not necessarily differ in the nature of their intrinsic content (consider circle and round, or explode and explosion), but rather in how this content is construed and profiled. A nominal predication presupposes the interconnections among a set of conceived entities,


Relations 75
and profiles the region thus established. On the other hand, a relational predication presupposes a set of entities, and profiles the interconnections among these entities.
For illustration, consider the contrast between the relational predication together and the nominal predication group. Let us assume that both are construed as involving precisely three individuals, whose togetherness or status as a group is based on spatial proximity. By assumption, then, the conceptual content of together and group is essentially the same; the semantic distinction between them (and hence their membership in different grammatical categories) depends on the contrasting images they impose on this content, notably with respect to profiling.
Let sell, el, and (e) stand for those cognitive events whose occurrence constitutes the conception of the three participating individuals (taken separately). Further, let e4د ل [es], and |c6) stand for the coordinating operations responsible for establishing interconnections between each pair of participating individuals; in the present case, these operations amount to assessments of spatial proximity--e.g. seal is the cognitive operation that registers the spatial proximity of the individuals whose conception resides in the occurrence of el and (el. Figure 3(a) then diagrams the essential conceptual content shared by together and group, expressed in terms of the requisite cognitive events. This entire complex of events figures in the conceptualization of either notion.

Figure 3.
As a relational predication, together presupposes the entities corresponding to [e1], el, and el, and profiles the interconnections among them. The special prominence characteristic of profiling-indicated by heavy lines--is accorded in Figure 3(b) to the coordinating operations (el, (el, and e6, which represent the pairwise assessments of spatial proximity. By definition, these interconnections establish a region comprising (c), [eo], and el. It is precisely this region that the nominal predication group puts in profile, as shown in Figure 3(c): the interconnecting operations are incorporated as unprofiled facets of the base, while leil, el, and (el receive the heightened prominence of profiling. However, they ādifüve this salience collectively, not individually; the dashed-line circles indicate that they are profiled only as facets of region tellel sell, which is depicted by
the solid-line circle and constitutes a higher level of conceptual organization.


76 Nouns and verbs
Relational predications are therefore not distinguished by their inherent conceptual content, but rather by their profiling of interconnections. We can think of interconnections as cognitive operations that assess the relative magnitude Or position of conceived entities within a domain. Consider the adjective parallel (as in A is parallel to B). Our conception of the profiled relationship must incorporate cognitive events that register the spatial discrepancy between two lines. We may speculate that the requisite events include at least the following: Scanning operations, which assess the distance between pairs of directly opposite points On the two lines; and comparison of these scanning operations with respect to their magnitude, which proves the same for every sampled pair. But whatever its actual character, this complex of events is virtually instantaneous, and we experience our conception as a single gestalt.
Recall that every relational predication shows an asymmetry in the prominence accorded the entities that participate in the profiled interconnections: some participant is singled out and construed as the one whose nature or location is being assessed. This participant ಸ್ಕ್ರೀaled the trajector (tr) and analyzed as the figure within the relational profile." The term landmark (lm) is applied to other salient participants, with respect to which the trajector is situated. The choice of trajector is not mechanically determined by a predication's content, but is rather one dimension of conventional imagery. Indeed, the asymmetry is observable even for expressions that designate a symmetrical relationship. Thus X resembles Y and Y resembles X are not semantically equivalent: in the former, Y (the landmark) is taken as a standard of reference for evaluating X (the trajector); in the latter these roles are reversed.
Participants which represent different levels of conceptual organization are capable of functioning as trajectors. In A is parallel to B, scanning operations presumably associate particular points along the two lines, but one of the lines as a whole, namely A, achieves the status of relational figure. Now by definition, the profiled interconnections establish A and B as a higher-level region, (AB), with the potential to be recognized as such for linguistic purposes. This happens in sentences of the form A and B are parallel: region (AB) is not only the profile of the subject nominal A and B, but also the trajector of (are) parallel. As a consequence, the interconnections profiled by the latter do not hold between the trajector (AB) and some external landmark-instead they associate subparts of the trajector. The same is true of many relational predications, most obviously shape expressions. The adjective square, for instance, invokes the conception of four line segments (A, B, C, and D) joined pairwise at their endpoints, and profiles the interconnecting operations that register their parallelism, perpendicularity, and equal length. The adjectival trajector is the higher-level region (ABCD) established by these operations, which therefore relate various subparts of the trajector to one another. The noun square has the same conceptual content as the adjective, but instead of the interconnections it profiles region (ABCD).
The trajector and landmark of a relational predication can be of various sorts.


Relations 77
Consider the boldface expressions in (5):
(5) a. The chandelier is above the buffet table.
b. Some guests left before the dancing started. c. Timothy really works fast.
In (5a), the trajector and landmark of above are both regions, and are thus instantiated by nominal expressions (the chandelier and the buffet table, respectively). The profiled interconnections specify that the trajector is displaced farther from the vertical Oriಖ್ಖ than is the landmark, while their horizontal projections roughly coincide." In (5b), before designates a relationship of precedence in the temporal domain between two events, which are represented by finite clauses. Hence its trajector (some guests left) and landmark (the dancing started) are themselves both relational. The domain for fast in (5c) is the conception that activities vary along the parameter of rate. Its trajector (works) profiles an activity and is therefore relational. This trajector is situated within a landmark that is not specifically named, but is identifiable as that portion of the rate scale which lies beyond an implicit norm.
Relations are either 'simple' or 'complex', depending on whether or not their profile reduces to a single, consistent configuration. Such a configuration IS reasonably called a 'state', so a simple relation can also be termed 'stative'. The italicized words in (5) all profile stative relations, as does across in (6a), by contrast, the same preposition is complex in (6b):
(6) a. There is a road across the desert.
b. The troops marched across the desert.
These two senses of across were respectively diagramed in Figures 9(a) and 9(b) of Chapter 1. Both senses specify that the trajector occupies a path leading from one side of the landmark to the other. The relation in (6a) is stative: since the trajector is an elongated object that simultaneously occupies the entire path, the profiled interconnections amount to a single configuration. In (6b), however, the trajector is small compared to the path, and thus occupies the points along it successively rather than simultaneously. This implies a continuous sequence of distinct configurations, each of which finds the trajector in a slightly different position vis-a-vis the landmark. The relation is therefore complex. It is internally coherent because the component states are conceived as being distributed along the temporal axis.


78 Nouns and verbs
7. Processes
Relational predications are divided into those that profile 'processes'', and those that designate 'atemporal relations'. The set of processual predications is coextensive with the class of verbs. By contrast, atemporal relations correspond to such traditional categories as prepositions, adjectives, adverbs, infinitives, and participles. The nature of the intended distinction requires explicit characterization, since it is not at all self-evident. What do I take to be a process? In what sense do I say that a verb is temporal, while other relations are atemporal?
If a verb is characterized semantically by the profiling of a process, we cannot simply define this notion as a relationship involving time: even a stative relation (e.g. before) can profile a configuration in the temporal domain. Nor is a process just a sequence of relational configurations, since that does not distinguish it from a complex atemporal relation. It does not even suffice to combine the two specifications, and describe a process as profiling a sequence of relationships distributed through time; this latter definition is perfectly compatible with one sense of across (as in (6b)), which is not a verb but a preposition. What, then, can we single out as a possible conceptual basis for the semantic contrast between a complex atemporal relation like across and an obviously related verb like cross? The difference must be quite subtle. I suggest that it does not pertain primarily to the content of the predications, but rather to how this content is construed through cognitive processing.
Two preliminary distinctions are necessary. The first is between 'conceived time' (t) and 'processing time' (T), i.e. between time as an OBJECT of conceptualization and time as the MEDIUM of conceptualization. Any conception whatever requires a certain span of processing time for the requisite cognitive operations. A fortiori, processing time is needed to conceptualize the passage of time, or to mentally follow the temporal evolution of a situation. Except in cases of immediate experience, there is no restriction that a span of conceived time must coincide in length with the span of processing time required for its conception; we have the mental capacity, in recalling or imagining a sequence of events, to either 'speed them up' or 'slow them down'. For example, I can mentally run through the steps involved in changing a tire, reviewing them all in a matter of seconds, but the physical implementation of these procedures takes considerably longer.
I further distinguish two modes of cognitive processing: 'summary' vs. ''Sequential Scanning'. In Summary Scanning, the various facets of a situation are examined in cumulative fashion, so that progressively a more and more complex conceptualization is built up; once the entire scene has been scanned, all facets of it are simultaneously available and cohere as a single gestalt. With respect to the cognitive events which constitute this experience, we can suppose that, once activated, events that represent a given facet of the scene remain active throughout. By contrast, Sequential scanning involves the successive transformation of one Scene into another. The various phases of an evolving situation are examined


Processes 79
serially, in noncumulative fashion; hence the conceptualization is dynamic, in the sense that its contents change from one instant to the next. At the level of cognitive events, we can suppose that events which represent a given scene remain active only momentaneously, and begin to decay as the following scene is initiated. These respective modes of scanning can be illustrated by our abilities to study a photograph and to watch a motion picture. Summary scanning is suited by nature to the conception of static situations, while sequential scanning lends itself to the conception of changes and events. We nevertheless have the conceptual agility tO construe an event by means of summary scanning. Thus we can watch the flight of a ball and then mentally reconstruct its trajectory, which we can even visualize as a line with a definite curvature. In terms of the photographic analogy, employing summary scanning for an event is like forming a still photograph through multiple exposures.
To make these notions explicit, I define the "construal relation' as the relationship between a conceptualizer and his conceptualization. In speech, the relevant conceptualizers are the speaker and addressee, and the relevant conceptualization is the meaning of a particular linguistic expression. The formulaic representation in (7a) indicates that conceptualizer C carries out conceptualization Q at point T of processing time.
(7) a. Ο
C
CT4
Formulas (7b) and (7c) then represent the construal of an event by means of sequential and summary scanning, respectively. Consider the conception of an object {ạlling to the ground, as sketched in Figure 4(a), where a-d label component states." Formula (7b) indicates that these states are accessed serially through processing time: C activates a at T1, b at T2, etc. When summary scanning is employed for the same event, as in (7c), active conceptualization grows progressively more elaborate: a is activated at T and remains active throughout the activation of b is added at T2: and so on. Summary scanning thus involves a


80 Nouns and verbs
"build-up phase', which continues until all the component states are simultaneously active and manipulable as a single gestalt. In the present example, the build-up phase results, at T4 in the composite conception depicted in Figure 4(b). In effect, all the component states are superimposed in a single image. The directionality of the conception-i.e. its construal as an object falling to the ground rather than rising from it--is attributable to how it is built up state by state.
(a) (b) a-d
al
Ο
Iloilo.

Figure 4. .
The distinction between sequential and summary scanning provides a natural basis for the contrast between processes and complex atemporal relations. Under this analysis, for instance, the verb cross and the preposition across may share the same conceptual content (Figure 9(b) of Chapter 1) but differ in how the component states of this complex relationship are accessed. A verb is thus a 'temporal' predication in the sense of following a situation state by state as it evolves through conceived time; its 'dynamic' character reflects the successive transformations deriving each component state from its predecessor. The corresponding atemporal relation employs summary scanning for the same series of states. Though it accesses these states in sequence during the build-up phase (which accounts for its directionality), the cumulative result is a complex conception in which all the component configurations are superimposed and simultaneously active.
We can now attempt an explicit description of the schema for processual predications. Let r stand for a stative relation, t, for a point in conceived time, and [r://'; for their coincidence. Formula (8a) thuis indicates that conceptualizer C activates at point T of processing time the conception of relation ";» and further situates this relation at point t; of conceived time.
(8) a. (r)/;
C T.


Processes 81
b. |[r]/t D (ry/) D (r3/3 > ... D. [rn/in
C T 3
C JT2 L C UT С ШТn
1
A process is then characterized by formula (8b). A processual predication involves a continuous Series of states r, r, r2, ..., 'n' each of which profiles a relation; it distributes these states through a continuous span t1 2 3, ... ', Of conceived time; and it employs sequential scanning for accessing this complex structure. A process contrasts with the corresponding atemporal relation by having a 'temporal profile', defined as the span of conceived time through which the profiled relationship is scanned sequentially.
By way of summary, every predication profiles some entity (recall that this notion is maximally inclusive, subsuming both regions and relations as special cases). A simple atemporal (or stative) relation profiles the interconnections between two or more entities and reduces to a single, consistent configuration (state). A complex atemporal relation profiles a series of relational configurations and scans them in summary fashion, so by definition it has no temporal profile (even if the states are distributed through conceived time). A process involves a series of relational configurations that necessarily extend through conceived time and are scanned sequentially (thus defining its temporal profile). Abbreviatory notations for these notions were given in Figure 10 of Chapter 1.


8. Motivation
I have no direct proof that formula (8b) is correct as the semantic characterization of verbs. Several considerations do however suggest its potential viability. First, it satisfies certain intuitions, accounting for both the dynamic character of verbs and their obvious association with time. Second, it relies only on constructs established independently (notably profiling, conceived time, and sequential scanning). Third, I have shown that a semantic definition of the verb class--if possible at all-must resemble (8b) in abstractness, and also in referring to cognitive processing; conceptual content is less important than how this content is construed and accessed. Finally, a strong claim of descriptive adequacy can be made for the overall analysis: it revealingly distinguishes the various types of relational predications, captures important grammatical generalizations, and explains certain peculiarities of verbal expressions in English.
Relational predications as a class are distinguished from nominal predications by their profiling of interconnections. Within this class, sequential Scanning accounts for the fundamental distinction between processes and atemporal relations, some of which are verb-like in content (i.e. they profile a sequence of relational configurations extending through conceived time). How do infinitives and participles fit into this scheme? Though sometimes called "nonfinite verb forms',


82 Nouns and verbs
they are #Pt in fact verbs by my definition-instead they designate attemporal relations." They nevertheless derive from verbs, so the profiled relation is characterized with reference to a process; this sets infinitives and participles apart from other atemporal relations. More specifically, the process designated by the verb stem functions as the base for the infinitival or participial predication overall. The semantic value of the derivational morphology (to, -ing, -ed) resides in the effect it has on the process introduced by the stem: each derivational morpheme profiles a schematically characterized atemporal relation, and imposes its atemporal profile on the processual base provided by the stem.
In brief, the morphemes deriving infinitives and participles have the semantic effect of suspending the sequential scanning of the verb stem, thereby converting the processual predication of the stem into an atemporal relation. Where these morphemes differ is in the additional effect they have on the processual notion that functions as their base. I analyze the infinitival to as having no additional effect whatever: in the first person to leave or Jack wants to leave, the infinitive to leave profiles the same sequence of relational configurations as the verb stem leave, but construes them by means of Summary Scanning as a single gestalt. Observe that the diagram for an infinitival predication, Figure 5(a), is the same as that for a process (Figure 10(e) of Chapter 1) except for the absence on its time arrow of the heavyline marking which indicates sequential scanning. The morpheme deriving past participles has several semantic variants, only two of which are noted here (see Chapter 4). One variant, diagramed in Figure 5(b), profiles only the final state of the base process; the resulting predication (e.g. broken in broken leg) is stative, because it profiles only a single relational configuration. Another variant derives the participles that appear in passives; as seen in Figure 5(c), it profiles all the component states of the base process, but impq: s on the composite predication a different choice of trajector (relational figure). Finally, the -ing predication has several effects that are discussed in section 10: besides the suspension of sequential Scanning, it imposes on the base process a restricted immediate Scope of
(a) INFINITIVE (b) STATIVE (c) PASSIVE
PARTICIPLE PARTICIPLE

Figure 5.


Motivation 83
predication, confines the profile to the component states within this immediate Scope, and construes these states as homogeneous.
Without attempting any detailed justification of these analyses, I note that the constructs of cognitive grammar enable us to distinguish infinitives and participles from both verbs and other atemporal relations, and to elucidate their subtle semantic contrasts. Moreover, the proposed taxonomy of relational predications has considerable descriptive import. I believe the following generalizations to be valid for English (and possibly universally):
(9) a. A finite clause always profiles a proce¥}, b. A noun modifier is always atemporal.
As implemented in English, (9a) requires that every finite clause contain a verb to function as clausal head, in the sense that its processual profile is inherited by the clause as a whole. Interpreted as full sentences, the expressions in (10) are consequently deviant, since they contain no verb to furnish the requisite profile:
(10) a. *The boy tall(s).
b. *The lamp above(s) the table. c. *A man strolling along the beach. d. *The rock star pursued by wild teenagers. c. *It already broken when I found it. f. *They to leave tomorrow.
Observe that participles and infinitives behave the same as adjectives and prepositions in this regard, just as we expect given their categorization as atemporal relations. It is possible, of course, to render these sentences grammatical simply by adding be:
(11) a. The boy is tall.
b. The lamp is above the table. c. A man is strolling along the beach. d. The rock star was pursued by wild teenagers. e. It was already broken when I found it. f. They are to leave tomorrow.
This phenomenon is explained by generalization (9a), together with the Semantic properties of be.
In numerous previous publications (e.g. 1981, 1982), I have argued that the auxiliary verbs be, have, and do designate highly schematic processes, i.e. they have little content beyond that which characterizes verbs as a class, as formulated in (8b). The semantic contrasts distinguishing be, have, and do are not essential here--we need only consider their common status as schematic processual


84 Nouns and verbs
predications. This special semantic value suits them for particular grammatical roles, one of which, illustrated in (10)-(11), is to furnish the temporal profile required for a finite clause whose major content is supplied by an atemporal predication. Be is processual, hence eligible to serve as clausal head, but it is only a 'skeletal' process, for its component states are not identified (apart from being relational). An adjective, preposition, participle, or infinitive puts "flesh' on the skeleton: it designates one or a sequence of relational configurations specified in substantial detail; when it combines with be, these relations are equated with be's component states. The resulting composite expression (e.g. be tall; be above; be pursued) inherits be's processual profile and therefore designates a specified process. The atemporal predication thus elaborates the schematic content of be, while be extends the atemporal relation through conceived time and imposes on it the Sequential Scanning necessary for a finite clause.
More generally, this analysis offers a principled explanation for a striking organizational feature of the English auxiliary, namely the dependency between have or be on the one hand, and the participial morphemes on the other (cf. Chomsky 1957). In a full finite clause, -ing demands the co-occurrence of be, while the past-participial morpheme requires either be or have (for its passive and perfect variants, respectively). These dependencies reflect the interaction of generalization (9a) with the semantic value of the participial inflections. These inflections suspend the sequential Scanning of the verb stem, thus deriving an atemporal predication; hence be or have must be added to 'retemporalize' the expression before it can function as clausal head. In a complex verb group, several cycles of Suspension and reimposition of Sequential Scanning can be observed, e.g. criticize (processual) > criticized (atemporal) > be criticized (proc.) > being criticized (atemp.) > be being criticized (proc.) > been being criticized (atemp.) > have been being criticized (proc.). Tense and agreement are manifested on the verb which supplies the processual profile at the highest level of organization.
The auxiliary verbs can also stand alone as clausal heads, in which case they are commonly regarded as pro forms, and the resulting sentences as elliptical:
(12) a. Sally is.
b. Joe has. c. Larry did.
I would simply say that these expressions are highly schematic (to the extent of being uninformative except in referring back to some previously identified process). Be, have, and do are true verbs, and can therefore function as clausal heads despite their skeletal character. Moreover, being processual predications they have a trajector (see Figure 10(e) of Chapter 1) which can be instantiated by a Subject noun phrase. Hence Sally is the actual Semantic and grammatical subject of be in (12a), just as it is in Sally is happy or Sally is running.
Generalization (9b) specifies the atemporality of noun modifiers. This is a


Motivation 85
natural restriction, since nouns themselves employ summary scanning and are thus atemporal. Adjectives, prepositions, participles, and infinitives can all be used to modify nouns:
(13) a... the tall boy
b. the lamp above the table
c. a man strolling along the beach
d. a rock star pursued by wild teenagers
e. a broken vase
f. the first person to leave What (9b) specifically rules out is the use of simple verbs in this capacity. The noun phrases in (14) are thus ill-formed.
(14) a. *a man stroll along the beach
b. *a break vase c. *the first person leave
The analysis further explains why atemporal predications do not tolerate be when functioning as noun modifiers, as in (15), though they require it in the verb group of a finite clause.
(15) a. *the be tall boy
b. *the lamp be above the table c. * a rock star be pursued by wild teenagers

9. Perfective vs. imperfective processes
The most fundamental aspectual distinction for ಜ್ಪish verbs is between what I call "perfective' vs. "imperfective' processes.' Perfectives and imperfectives can be identified by well-known grammatical criteria; e.g. imperfectives occur in the simple present tense, but not in the progressive:
(16) a. Harry resembles his father. a. *Harry is resembling his father.
b. Paul knows the answer. b. *Paul is knowing the answer.
By contrast, perfectives do occur in the progressive, but not in the simple present:
(17) a. *Tom builds a canoe. a. Tom is building a canoe.
b. *Tom learns the answer. b. Tom is learning the answer.
Sentences like (17a) and (17b) are of course acceptable with a special interpretation (e.g. habitual, historical present), but not when they indicate one


86 Nouns and verbs
instance of the designated process situated at the time of speaking. Though Such differences alert us to the existence of an aspectual contrast, I do not regard them as definitions for the perfective and imperfective classes, but rather as symptomatic of an underlying semantic distinction. The classification does not, in any case, amount to a rigid partitioning of the verbal lexicon. Some verbs function comfortably in either class, while verbs that normally belong to one are often shifted to the other by a complement or adverb. Moreover, there are patterns of semantic extension which effect a change in category without marking it overtly (e.g. a perfective can be construed as habitual, hence imperfective).
I have argued previously (e.g. 1982) that a perfective process portrays a situation as changing through time, while an jnperfective process describes the extension through time of a stable situation." My definition of a process, (8b), does not specify change; it requires only that a series of profiled relations be distributed through conceived time and scanned sequentially. The analysis therefore predicts the existence of imperfective processes: they constitute a limiting case, where all the component states happen to be identical. The presence vs. the absence of change is nevertheless a significant qualitative distinction. It proves responsible for the contrasting behavior of perfectives and imperfectives.
An examination of typical instances provides initial support for the characterization. Canonical perfectives (e.g. jump, kick, learn, explode, arrive, cook, ask) clearly involve some change through time. By contrast, imperfectives (e.g. resemble, have, know, want, like) are plausibly interpreted as describing the perpetuation through time of a static configuration. More instructive, perhaps, are cases where the same verb instantiates both categories. For example, the verbs in (18) are imperfective (as shown by their occurrence in the simple present), while in (19) the same verbs are used perfectively (as witnessed by their occurrence in the progressive):
(18) a. An empty moat surrounds the old castle.
b. His parents have a lovely home in the country. c. Roger likes his new teacher.
(19) a. The soldiers are surrounding the old castle. b. His parents are having a violent argument. c. Roger is liking his new teacher more and more every day.
The situations described in (18) are potentially quite stable; certainly these sentences do not portray them as changing in any way. By contrast, the Sentences in (19) are specifically concerned with changing configurations: the Soldiers move into position around the castle, the parents %yy out an activity, and Roger's opinion of his teacher becomes more favorable.
Various scholars (e.g. Mourelatos 1981) have noted a similarity between the perfective/imperfective (or active/stative) contrast for verbs and the count/mass


Perfective vs. imperfective processes 87
distinction for nouns. I will go one step further, and claim that the perfective/imperfective and count/mass distinctions are precisely identical, when due allowances are made for the intrinsic difference between verbs and nouns. The basis for comparing the two distinctions is spelled out in (20):
(20) a. The component states of a process (each profiling a relation) are analogous
to the component entities constituting the region profiled by a noun. b. For a process, time is the primary domain with respect to which the
presence vs. the absence of bounding is determined.
Once these identifications are made, it is readily seen that the various properties distinguishing count and mass nouns, reviewed in (21), are mirrored in full detail by the respective properties in (22), which I claim to be valid for the contrast between perfective and imperfective processes.
(21) a. The region profiled by a mass noun is construed as being internally
homogeneous. b. A mass is indefinitely expansible/contractible (any subpart is itself
a valid instance of the category). c. The region profiled by a count noun is specifically bounded within
the scope of predication in its primary domain. d. Replicability (pluralizability) is possible for count nouns.
(22) a. The component states of an imperfective process are construed as all
being effectively identical. b. An imperfective process is indefinitely expansible/contractible (any
series of component states is itself a valid instance of the category). c. A perfective process is specifically bounded in time within the scope
of predication. d. Replicability (repetitive aspect) is possible for perfective processes.
For verbs as well as nouns, the properties of homogeneity, expansibility, bounding, and replicability are intimately related. Expansion or contraction does not affect the identity of a process if all its component states are identical (since any series of states is then qualitatively the same as any other). Internal homogeneity precludes distinctive initial and final states; it thus removes the most obvious basis for bounding, which is necessary for replicability. Moreover, indefinite expansibility/contractibility is incompatible with both bounding and replicability.
The contrast between perfective and imperfective processes is sketched in Figure 6. Each profiles a sequence of relational configurations distributed through conceived time. These component states are represented by a wavy line for the perfective process, to indicate change through time, and by a straight line for the imperfective, to indicate constancy through time. A perfective process is so called


88 Nouns and verbs
because it is bounded, i.e. its endpoints are included within the scope of predication in the temporal domain. No such specification of bounding is made for an imperfective process; it profiles a stable situation that may extend indefinitely far beyond the scope of predication in either direction, although-by degyition-the profile is confined to those component states that fall within this scope.' For each process, the heavy-line segment of the time arrow marks the temporal profile, characterized by sequential scanning through the profiled states.
(a) PERFECTIVE FROCESS (b) IMPERFECTIVE PROCESS
\ η

  • - -
    H

    Figure 6.
    This characterization of perfective and imperfective processes accounts straightforwardly for their contrastive grammatical behavior. One such difference is alluded to in (22d), namely the occurrence of perfectives (but not imperfectives) with repetitive aspect. We can force a repetitive construal by means of the adverb again and again:
    (23) a. Harry played the tune again and again.
    b. *Harry resembled his father again and again.
    There are of course contexts where (23b) might be acceptable--e.g. the speaker may mean that Harry went through several distinct stages where he resembled his father, though he failed to resemble him at other times. Observe, however, that this interpretation implies a nonconventional construal of resemble, whereby it designates a limited episode of resemblance, including both the initiation and the termination of this relationship. This bounding renders it perfective, hence replicable.
    Perfectives and imperfectives also behave differently in sentences like the following, where the first clause is in the past tense, while the Second clause specifies the continuation of the designated process through the present:
    (24) a. *Paul learned the answer.--in fact he still does.
    b. Paul knew the answer-in fact he still does.
    The imperfective know is acceptable in such sentences, but the perfective learn is precluded (barring some special interpretation, e.g. habitual). An explanation
    Perfective vs. imperfective processes 89
    requires an explicit description of the present and past tenses in English. The one I propose could hardly be more straightforward:
    (25) a. Present: A full instantiation of the profiled process occurs and precisely
    coincides with the time of speaking. b. Past: A full instantiation of the profiled process occurs prior to the
    time of speaking.
    Although these definitions may appear naive, they are sufficien, or the purpose at hand. I believe, in fact, that they are perfectly valid for English.
    Given the definition of a perfective process, the deviance of (24a) can now be explained. A perfective is bounded, so a full instantiation includes its endpoints. The past-tense marking on learn thus implies that the entire bounded processincluding its endpoints-is situated prior to the time of speaking. This situation is diagramed in Figure 7(a), where the box with zigzag lines indicates the speech event. It is immediately apparent that this configuration is incompatible with continuation of the profiled process through the time of speaking. But that is precisely what the second clause specifies, so (24a) is anomalous. By contrast, (24b) is acceptable by virtue of the expansibility/contractibility of imperfectives. Suppose that Paul's knowledge of the answer continues through the present, as indicated by the upper line in Figure 7(b); the specifications of the second clause are thus satisfied. What about the first clause? The past-tense marking on know demands a full instantiation of this process prior to the time of speaking. The demand is satisfied by the profiling indicated in 7(b): for imperfectives, any
    (a) PAST PERFECTIVE (b) PAST IMPERFECTIVE
    (c) PRESENT IMPERFECTIVE

    Figure 7.


90 Nouns and verbs
Sequence of component states constitutes a valid instance of the category, so the profiled segment of the overall process is itself a full instantiation of know.
This same property of imperfectives explains their occurrence in the simple present, as defined in (25a). Whenever an imperfective process includes the time of speaking within its temporal extension, as diagramed in Figure 7(c), we can confine the profile to that segment of the overall process which precisely coincides with the speech event, and we will still have a valid instance of the process in question. I assume that the present-tense predication achieves this effect by imposing, on the process designated by the verb stem, an immediate scope of predication that is temporally coextensive with the time of speaking. But though the profile is necessarily limited to the immediate scope of predication, the overall process referred to by the stem is still evoked as the base (and maximal scope of predication) for a present-tense verb.
Why do perfectives not occur in the present without a special interpretation? There is nothing intrinsically anomalous about the configuration that this implies, which is sketched in Figure 7(d). The difficulty is rather that circumstances normally prevent this situation from arising. For one thing, the span of time required for a bounded process to occur has no inherent connection with the time required for a speech event describing it. Even if the profiled process were the right length, the speaker could hardly describe it with a precisely coincident speech event: to do so, he would have to begin his description at exactly the instant when the process is initiated, before he had a chance to observe its occurrence and identify it. Once he observes a full instantiation of the process (including its endpoint), it is too late to initiate a temporally coincident description. Striking confirmation of this explanation is provided by the one notable exception to the generalization that perfectives do not occur in the simple present, namely that of explicit performatives:
(26) a. I order you to put that rifle down! b. I promise that I will behave.
Performative verbs are perfective, and by definition they occur in the simple present as characterized in (25a). Obviously this is a motivated exception: in a performative sentence the profiled process is identified with the speech event itself, so it is not only possible but actually necessary for the two to coincide.
When a perfective other than a performative occurs with present-tense form, it receives some 'special' interpretation that avoids the problems cited above. In Some languages, the corresponding morphology is polysemous, indicating present tense with imperfectives but recent past with perfectives. For English, a sentence like (27a) will most likely be construed as habitual, hence imperfective; the act of drinking two martinis for lunch is portrayed as a regular practice whose institutionalization is stable through conceived time.
Perfective vs. imperfective processes 91
(27) a. Ralph drinks two martinis for lunch.
b. The expedition leaves tomorrow at noon. c. This sleazy character walks up to me on the street yesterday and
offers to make me rich. d. Bird passes to McHale. McHale shoots. He scores!
The “imminent future' interpretation of (27b) is perhaps to be analyzed in parallel fashion; i.e. the stable situation extending through the present is not the act of leaving, but rather that of the leaving being 'scheduled' for tomorrow at noon. The historical present, illustrated in (27c), involves a type of mental transfer, whereby a past event is described as if it were unfolding at the moment of speaking. The event's temporal extension is made to coincide with that of the speech event by means of an ability noted previously (section 7): Our capacity, 1. recalling or imagining an event, to "speed it up' or 'slow it down' as desired. Finally, present-tense perfectives are used in the 'play-by-play' mode of speech, as in (27d), which can be regarded as a special adaptation of the historical present. The time-lag between the reported event and the speech event is as short as the announcer can make it, and the audience accepts their coincidence as a COn VCIn 1CInt fiction (cf. Langacker 1982).
10. Progressives
One last grammatical difference is the occurrence of perfectives, but not Of imperfectives, in the be...-ing progressive construction. The basic reason is simply that the progressive is imperfectivizing, hence its occurrence with imperfectives would be superfluous. To be sure, the restriction does not follow as al inevitable consequence-languages do sometimes evolve redundant constructions--but it is nonetheless natural in functional terms. -
The progressive construction is semantically quite regular, given independently established values of be and -ing. The semantic effect of adding -ing to a verb stem is to convert a process into an atemporal relation; by the generalizations in (9), the participle so derived can serve as a noun modifier, but not as the head of a. finite clause. The function of be is to retemporalize the participial predication, deriving a higher-order verb (e.g. be learning) capable of occurring 2S clausal head. Be does so by imposing its ow་ processual profile (including sequential scanning) on the composite expression. - -
Constructs already at hand permit a precise semantic description of -ing and the progressive construction overall. From a perfective verb stem, as diagramed in Figure 6(a), -ing derives an atemporal relation with the properties indicated in Figure 8(a). The process designated by the Stem COnStituteS the base and scope of predication for the participle. Within this base, -ing imposes a restricted immediate scope of predication comprising an arbitrary sequence of internal states


92 Nouns and verbs
(i.e. the initial and final states are excluded). By definition, the profile is confined to this immediate scope--hence the commonplace intuition that the progressive takes an 'internal perspective' on the action described by the verb stem. The profiled series of states is represented by a straight (rather than a wavy) line to indicate that it is construed as homogeneous. The component states are not identical in any strict sense, but their degree of divergence depends on the level of schematicity at which they are viewed. I propose that the participle focuses on the commonality of the profiled states as component members of the same base
វិ ಬ್ಲೂ portrays them as a homogeneous set on the basis of this abstract Similarity.
(a) W-ING (b) BE W-ING
immedia te immediate Scope Scope
sumus\J
Figure 8.
In addition, -ing atemporalizes the base process by Suspending sequential
scanning, so the temporal profile of Figure 6(a) is absent in 8(a). The semantic contribution of be is to reinstitute sequential scanning of the profiled relationship, and thus to restore its processual character at a higher level of organization. The composite expression be V-ing is therefore processual, as shown in Figure 8(b), but the process it designates is not precisely the same as the process profiled by the verb stem. With respect to the perfective process V, the composite expression be V-ing defines a higher-order process that is limited to some internal portion of V, and construes the profiled states at a level of schematicity which renders them effectively identical. This process is imperfective because the profiled relationship is portrayed as stable through time (within the limits implied by its base).
We must now consider sentences like those in (28), which appear to be counterexamples to the claim that the progressive only occurs with perfectives:
(28) a. He is sleeping.
b. He is wearing a sweater. c. He is walking.


Progressives 93
Sleep and wear a sweater do not suggest any substantial change through time, and there is an obvious sense in which walk is internally homogeneous, even though physical activity is involved. If we classify these processes as imperfective because of their homogeneous character, then their occurrence in the progressive is exceptional. I will argue, however, that the verbs in question are in fact perfective. The comparison of count and mass nouns proves instructive. The region designated by a mass noun is internally homogeneous and unbounded within the immediate scope of predication; that profiled by a count noun is necessarily bounded, and is typically heterogeneous. However, internal diversity is neither prerequisite for bounding nor an obligatory feature of COunt nouns: a COunt noun like spot is bounded by contrast with surroundings, not by internal configuration, and the profiled region is homogeneous out to its boundary. I am claiming that the count/mass and perfective/imperfective distinctions are precisely identical, given the correspondences spelled out in (20). The overall analysis therefore predicts the existence of perfective processes analogous to spot, which are internally homogeneous but nevertheless construed as being bounded. This is what I propose for verbs like sleep, wear (a sweater), walk, swim, dream, perspire, etc.
Processes like these typically occur in 'bounded episodes' rather than continuing indefinitely. Their episodic nature is evidently incorporated as part of the conventigal value of these verbs, and is responsible for their categorization as perfectives.' We thus find the distinctions diagramed in Figure 9, where (a) represents a canonical perfective like jump, (c) a canonical imperfective like resemble, and (b) a verb like sleep. Within the class of perfectives, verbs of type (b) are a limiting case, in which the degree of internal variation approximates Zero. These processes are nevertheless bounded, as some limit is imputed to the set of component states which constitutes the processual profile. From another perspective, we can say that the change implied by type-(b) perfectives is confined to the initiation and the termination of the process.
Figure 9.
Strongly corroborating this analysis are instances where the same lexeme has variants of types (b) and (c):


94 Nouns and verbs
(29) a. A statue of George Lakoffstands in the plaza.
b. This machine lacks a control lever.
(30) a. A statue of George Lakoff is standing in the plaza.
b. This machine is lacking a control lever.
Since they occur in the simple present, the verbs in (29) are imperfective, whereas those in (30), with the progressive, must be type-(b) perfectives. My analysis claims that each verb stem in (29) construes the designated situation as extending indefinitely through time, while in (30) it portrays the same situation as constituting a bounded episode. This is evidently so: (29a) suggests that the plaza is the permanent home for Lakoff's statue, while (30a) either indicates that the statue is there only temporarily, or else reports on someone's immediate (hence temporary) perception of its location. Similarly, (29b) suggests that the absence of a control lever is part of the machine's design, whereas (30b) intimates a contingent situation finding the machine in need of repair. The analysis further predicts such judgments as the following:
(31) a. Belgium lies between Holland and France.
b. *Belgium is lying between Holland and France.
(32) a. *Peter lies on the beach right now.
b. Peter is lying on the beach right now.
Belgium's position vis-a-vis Holland and France is permanent for all intents and
purposes, but a person generally lies on the beach only in bounded episodes.
Properly interpreted, I believe this analysis to be compatible with the seemingly very different one proposed by Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982), which explicates the contrast between the simple present and the present progressive in terms of a distinction between 'structural' and "phenomenal' knowledge. In judging a property to be structural (i.e. a matter of how the world is made), we portray it as something that will endure until the world itself changes; we thereby lend it an intrinsic permanence that precludes its occurring in bounded episodes. Of course, what constitutes the 'world'' is subject to variable construal (cf. Fauconnier 1985), and a process is imperfective only with respect to a given scope of predication. At one extreme, the world can be equated with the physical or mathematical universe. If we define the relevant scope of predication as the full temporal expanse of human experience, the situations described in (33) are stable throughout and unbounded within this scope:


Progressives 95
(33) a. Water consists of hydrogen and oxygen.
b. Two plus two equals four.
(34) a. Thelma dyes her hair.
b. Thelma is dyeing her hair (these days).
However, to explicate the contrast in (34) we must narrow our horizons considerably. The 'world' is essentially limited to Thelma and her activities, and the scope of predication is a vaguely delimited portion of her lifespan, sufficiently long for behavioral patterns to be established and identified. In (34a), the practice of hair-dyeing is portrayed as a stable part of Thelma's behavioral repertoire throughout this span of time. In contrast, (34b) depicts this practice as being only temporary: Thelma regularly dyes her hair at present, but this has not always been her practice, nor is it expected to continue indefinitely. Regular recourse to hairdyeing constitutes only a bounded episode within the overall period of Thelma's life that concerns uS.
The interaction between aspect and scope of predication is further illustrated in (35):
(35) a. A truly great linguist is sitting there. b. There sits a truly great linguist!
Sit is normally perfective; though internally homogeneous, the process it designates is construed as occurring in bounded episodes. The progressive is therefore required to describe a single instance of this process that temporally includes the speech event, as in (35a). The simple present nevertheless appears in (35b), suggesting an imperfective construal that allows the profiled process to coincide precisely with the time of speaking. This special construal arises because (35b) represents a marked grammatical construction with inherent semantic import. The construction is strongly deictic, as witnessed by the preposing of there. Its effect, intuitively, is to spotlight a particular facet of immediate experience: it directs all attention to whatever is presently occurring in the region pointed to by there. With respect to the temporal domain, the effect of this focusing operation is diagramed in Figure 10. The full episode of sitting constitutes the base, so the boundaries of this episode are included in the overall scope of predication. However, the focusing operation imposes on this base a restricted immediate scope of predication, the temporal extension of which is centered on the speech event, and which does not include the boundaries of the full sitting episode. Since the profile is necessarily confined to the immediate Scope, where bounding does not occur, the designated process is imperfective.


96 Nouns and verbs
Scope
Scope
Figure 10.
In (36) we observe an interesting variation on this theme:
(36) a. This road winds through the mountains.
b. This road is winding through the mountains.
Speakers agree that the sentences are appropriate in different contexts: (36a) might be used in planning a trip or examining a road map, while (36b) reports on what one actually experiences while driving along the road. I therefore analyze these Sentences as differing in their Scope of predication, particularly as it applies to road. We can once more employ Figure 10 to diagram this essential contrastwe need only apply it to space (not time), and interpret the bounded line segment aS the road (not the process). In (36a), the spatial scope of predication affords an overview of the entire complex configuration; a long expanse of road is presented in a single gestalt, in relation to the contours of the mountains. The subject nominal thus profiles the entire road, which corresponds to the full line segment in Figure 10. Example (36b) takes this overall configuration as its base, but imposes on it an immediate scope of predication which encompasses only what the passengers can See at one time. The immediate Scope delimits the profile, so what counts as the road In (36b) is that segment of road which is visible at a given moment. How road is construed determines the aspectual value of wind (as reflected in the choice of simple present vs. progressive). The holistic construal in (36a) renders wind imperfective: viewed as a whole, the road does not change position vis-a-vis the mountains; the overall configuration is constant as it is scanned sequentially through conceived time. But when road is construed restrictively, to include only what is immediately visible, then wind becomes perfective: the road (so identified) ΠΟ longer Occupies a constant position in relation to the mountains, wind therefore designates a change through time rather than a stable situation.
We Saw earlier that the difference between a simple and a complex atemporal relation may hinge on the size of an object relative to a path it occupies (cf. Figure 9 of Chapter 1). The perfective/imperfective contrast in (36) is similarly dependent O the relative sizes of the trajector--as determined by the immediate scope of predication-and the full trajectory it follows. Shifts in the scope of predication are not always responsible for contrasts involving this size factor. Consider (37):
Progressives 97
(37) a. Tom is going from Dallas to Houston.
b. This road goes from Dallas to Houston.
Tom is small in relation to the distance between Dallas and Houston, while a road is potentially long enough to occupy the full path simultaneously. Go is thus perfective in (37a) because it describes a change, but imperfective in (37b) because it describes a stable situation with indefinite temporal extension. These two senses of go make precisely the same locative specifications (the trajector occupies all the points along a path), but differ in their distribution through conceived time. In the perfective variant, the trajector occupies just one point in the path for each component state. The imperfective variant essentially telescopes the component states of the perfective into a single, more elaborate configuration, which is then followed holistically through conceived time as a stable situation.
The aspectual properties of a verb can also be influenced by the temporal extension of its object. See is normally imperfective and hence occurs in the
simple present, as in (38a):
(38) a. I see a rhinoceros. b. *I see a flash. c. *I am seeing a flash.
A typical rhino has sufficient object permanence to support an imperfective predication; i.e. the circumstance of someone seeing it is potentially stable for a period at least long enough to include the entire time of speaking, as the simple present requires (cf. Figure 7(c)). A flash, however, is instantaneous. Its temporal duration is simply not long enough for seeing it to be construed as a stable situation extending through time. See a flash is therefore perfective, and (38b) is ill-formed when given a simple-present interpretation. We normally resort to the progressive in describing one present-time instance of a perfective process, but (38c) shows that this too is precluded with see a flash. My characterization of -ing and the progressive construction (Figure 8) affords a ready explanation: -ing imposes On a process a restricted immediate scope of predication comprising an arbitrary sequence of internal states, and it portrays as homogeneous the profiled situation thus selected. This is hardly possible with a punctual process like see a flash, which basically consists of just the onset and offset of a visual sensation-there is nothing in between to construe as an ongoing situation.


11. Abstract. In Oul Ins
Abstract nouns and nominalizations have always been considered problematic for a notional account of basic grammatical categories. In large measure the difficulties stem from an objectivist view of linguistic semantics; they seem far less formidable when meaning is equated with cognitive processing and conventional


98 Nouns and verbs
imagery is properly accommodated. The following remarks are brief and Selective, but may at least indicate that abstract nominals are amenable to this type of analysis.
The verb explode and its nominalization explosion can both be used to describe the same event (Something explodedl; There was an explosion!). An objectivist might conclude that the verb and noun are semantically identical, with the consequence that the grammatical category of an expression cannot be predicted from its meaning. My own claim is that explode and explosion contrast Semantically because they employ different images to structure the same conceptual content: explode imposes a processual construal on the profiled event, while explosion portrays it as an abstract region. Nominalizing a verb necessarily endows it with the conceptual properties characteristic of nouns.
My analysis straightforwardly accommodates the reification implied by deverbal nouns like explosion. The verb stem designates a process, comprising a series of component states Scanned sequentially through conceived time. Each component state can be regarded as an entity (recall that this notion is maximally inclusive). Moreover, the very fact that these states are coordinated (through sequential Scanning) as facets of an integrated, higher-order conception is sufficient to establish them as a set of interconnected entities, and hence as a region. Every process therefore defines an implicit region consisting of its component states. A nominalization like explosion simply raises this region to the level of explicit concern as the profile of the composite predication.
The semantic contrast between a verb and its nominalization is schematized in Figure 11. Diagram (a) is simply the abbreviatory notation adopted earlier for processes, except that I have added a dashed-line ellipse to indicate the implicit region defined by the interconnection of its component states. Within the verb itself, this latent region has no particular salience; standing in profile are the relational configurations of the individual states, not the region per se, which pertains to a higher level of conceptual organization. The effect of the nominalization is to shift the profile to this higher level: it takes the process designated by the verb stem as its base, and within this base it selects for profiling the higher-order region comprising the component states. These states are profiled only collectively, as facets of the abstract region, so despite their individual status as relations the overall predication is nominal (cf. Figure 3(c)).
Explosion is one of many deverbal nominalizations that designate a single instance of the perfective process indicated by the verb stem: an explosion, a jump, a throw, a yell, a kick, a walk, etc. That the derived form is in each case a count noun follows directly from the proposed analysis: a perfective process is bounded, i.e. there is some limit to the set of component states; the region profiled by the nominalization takes these states for its constitutive entities, so it is bounded as well (cf. (20a)). With imperfective processes, the set of component states is not inherently limited. A parallel type of nominalization, namely one that simply profiles the component states as an abstract region, therefore yields a mass noun;


Abstract nouns 99
(b) NOMINALIZATION

Figure 11.
examples include hope, fear, love, desire, belief, and admiration. There are of course other patterns of nominalization (e.g. count-noun variants Of hope, fear, and belief designate the object of the imperfective process, not the reified process itself). And there are abstract nouns with comparable value that are not derived from verbs (e.g. wit, chastity, woe, faith). -
Perfective processes also give rise to nominalizations that function aS maSS nouns: jumping, yelling, walking, procrastination, sleep, etc. Several considerations suggest that the difference between the corresponding count and mass nouns, e.g. between jump and jumping, is analogous to that between lake and water: just as a lake is a circumscribed body of water, so can a !итр be regarded as a bounded instance of the abstract 'substance' jumping. For one thing, a noun like jumping does not describe a single episode of the base process, but instead refers to it in a generalized, even generic fashion (e.g. Jumping lS hard on the knees); similarly, a mass noun like water receives a generic interpretation unless there is some reason to construe it more narrowly. Moreover, a Jump is one specific event bounded in time (the primary domain for processes), and a lake is one body of water bounded in space (the primary domain for physical substances). By contrast, neither jumping nor water is continuous or bounded in its primary domain, though each inhabits this domain. Jитріпg shows discontinuous distribution through time (as well as space), being instantiated whenever SOme instance of the process jump occurs. In similar fashion, water lies scattered about in lakes, rivers, puddles, drops, and oceans; the category is instantiated wherever there occurs some quantity of a substance with the requisite propertes. Finally, neither jumping nor water qualifies as a region on the basis of distribution in its primary domain, but rather by virtue of qualitative homogeneity. The qualitative unity of water's scattered instantiations derives from their common location A. quality space (section 5). Jumping is homogeneous in the sense that instantiations reside in the occurrence of a single type of process.
Though abstract nominals pose many subtle problems that have barely REN explored, I feel the present approach provides important tools for the eventua resolution of these problems. I further expect the schematic characterizations


100 Nouns and verbs
proposed for count and mass nouns to prove adequate for all members of these classes, both concrete and abstract.
12. Conclusion
The noun and verb categories are universal and fundamental to grammatical Structure. That such a distinction should have a conceptual basis is, on the face of it, hardly surprising. Why, in fact, would anybody believe (or want to believe) otherwise? Nonetheless, informed opinion and theoretical orthodoxy overwhelmingly support the contrary position (indeed, the presumed impossibility of a notional characterization is critical to sustaining the autonomy of grammatical structure). I have tried to show that the usual arguments for this position are crucially dependent certain assumptions about the nature of meaning and linguistic semantics." The validity of these assumptions cannot be accepted apriori. Even the staunchest advocate of objectivist semantics would not pretend that it offers a convincing account of linguistic meaning in all its varied aspects.
Cognitive grammar makes radically different assumptions, and arrives at very different conclusions. By adopting a conceptualist, imagist view of linguistic Semantics, it is possible (at least in principle) to achieve a notional characterization of the noun and verb classes, as well as their major subclasses. Why, though, should these characterizations-couched as they are in terms of such mysterious entities as cognitive events--be given any credence? There are two basic reasons. First, this approach has led to a highly coherent and (I hope) revealing analysis. It accounts in unified fashion for an extremely broad array of data, and affords a natural explanation for many puzzling phenomena. Second, it invokes only constructs that are either well-attested independently or have prima facie cognitive plausibility: processing time, event coordination, relative prominence, figure/ground alignment, levels of organization, Sequential Scanning, bounding, degrees of Schematicity, scope of predication, effective homogeneity, etc. Though linguistic theorists seldom deal with such notions, I see little reason to doubt their psychological validity or their potential relevance to linguistic Semantics.
At the very least, I have indicated what a notional characterization of basic grammatical categories must look like, if any is possible at all. There is no real hope of finding universally valid definitions based on objective factors, or even on conceptual content alone; the critical factor--to be addressed at the level of cognitive processing--is how this content is accessed and construed. As linguists, we can hardly concern ourselves with specific neural circuits or the firing of individual neurons. We can, however, make plausible assumptions about the functional architecture of the complex cognitive events responsible for particular types of mental experience. Such attempts are surely speculative, and possibly premature. But they are hardly avoidable in the long run if one is serious about treating language as a psychological phenomenon.

4. The English passive
In wide sectors of the theoretical linguistic community, general agreement has been reached on certain broad and fundamental points." The theses listed in (1) amount to a deeply ingrained, almost archetypal view of grammar which is accepted virtually without question by many theorists, and which serves as implicit frame of reference for much contemporary theoretical discourse:
(1)a. Economy is to be sought in linguistic description. Specifically, particular
statements are to be excised if the grammar contains a general statement (rule) that fully subsumes them.
b. Linguistic structure can be resolved into numerous separate, essentially
self-contained components.
c. As a special case of thesis (b), syntax is an autonomous component distinct
from both semantics and lexicon.
d. Supporting (c), it can be presumed that semantic structure is universal,
while grammatical structure varies greatly from language to language.
e. In accordance with theses (c) and (d), syntactic structure relies crucially on 'grammatical morphemes', which are often meaningless and serve purely formal purposes.
f. Syntactic structure is abstract. Surface structures often derive from deep
structures which are significantly different in character, and contain elements (grammatical morphemes) that have no place in underlying StruCiturC.
g. Syntax consists primarily of general rules. It is to be distinguished sharply
from lexicon, the repository for irregularity and idiosyncrasy.
The archetypal viewpoint is a coherent one that has enjoyed considerable descriptive success in narrowly circumscribed areas. However, it is not the Only conceivable view. Nor can established theories claim such decisive triumphs across the entire range of linguistic phenomena awaiting explication that one can justifiably allow the archetype to stand as a definitive characterization of the parameters of viable linguistic inquiry. In attempting to formulate a more natural and broadly-grounded conception of linguistic structure, I have found reason to reject all the above theses. Cognitive grammar maintains the contrasting theses outlined in (2):
(2) a. Economy must be consistent with psychological reality. The grammar of a
language represents conventional linguistic knowledge and includes all linguistic structures learned as established 'units''. "Content units' coexist in the grammar with subsuming 'schemas'.

SLS

5. Abstract motion

A well-known fact of language change is that verbs meaning 'go often evolve into markers of future tense.* The French construction illustrated in (1) and its English translation are among the numerous examples that could be cited (cf. Givon 1973).
(1) Il va finir bientot. He is going to finish soon'
This Semantic shift is commonly attributed to spatial metaphor, wherein the meaning 'motion away from the speaker' is transferred from the spatial to the temporal domain. While accepting the basic validity of this analysis, I would nevertheless argue that as it stands it is insufficiently precise. For example, who should we take to be the mover, the speaker or the subject? In what sense is it meaningful to speak of "motion through time'? My objective is to answer these questions, and to show how the shift from "go" to 'future' is related to a variety of Other phenomena. I will argue that the shift receives a natural and explicit characterization granted a number of independently motivated concepts and analyses of cognitive grammar.
1. Basic concepts and assumptions
My initial assumption is that meaning is properly equated with conceptualization, in a Suitably broad Sense of that term. Moreover, conceptualization can be analyzed at either of two levels: the phenomenological level (i.e. that of mental experience), and the level of cognitive events (i.e. neurological activity). I assume, in other words, that having a particular mental experience resides in the occurrence of some pattern of neural activation. Conceptualist semantics has thus far concerned itself primarily with the phenomenological level, as a matter of necessity. Still, the structures at this level must eventually be explicated with reference to neurological events. Though we can hardly hope to pin things down to the firing of specific neurons, we might at least hope to determine the functional architecture of those events whose occurrence could conceivably constitute a given experience.
In this spirit, I make the further (and I think quite plausible) assumption that any conception involving ordering or directionality at the experiential level implies Some type of seriality at the processing level; an ordered conception necessarily incorporates the sequenced occurrence of cognitive events as one facet of its neurological implementation, and this sequencing is taken as being constitutive of the conceptual ordering. As an obvious and convenient example of an ordered conception, consider our ability to mentally recite the alphabet. The mental

150 Abstract motion
recitation of any individual letter must reside in the occurrence of Some pattern of neural activation, which we can treat as a single cognitive event (despite its internal complexity). It is apparent, moreover, that our knowledge of the alphabet as an ordered structure reduces to our ability to recite the letters in proper sequence. Clearly, in performing this mental exercise of running through the sequence a > b > c > ... > x > y > z), we activate in serial fashion those cognitive events that constitute the recitation of the individual letters.
To avoid confusion, we must distinguish between the conception OF time, on the one hand, and the fact that conception takes place THROUGH time, on the other hand. I therefore speak of conceived time (symbolized t) and processing time (symbolized T), pertaining to the phenomenological and the event levels, respectively. Conceived time is time as an OBJECT of conceptualization; I conceive OF time when I consult my watch, when I use a word like hefore, ᎤᎱ CᏙCIᏁ when I see something happen (e.g. an object falling to the ground)." By contrast, processing time is time as a MEDIUM of conceptualization: every cognitive event requires some span of processing time for its occurrence (however brief it might be), including events that constitute the atemporal conception of static situations. Despite their obvious relationship, these two sorts of time are functionally distinct and must be separated for analytical purposes.
We also need a convenient way of referring to the relationship between a conceptualizer and the conceptualization he entertains at a given moment. I call this the construal relation, and adopt for it the notation in (2), where C stands for the conceptualizer, and Q for his immediate mental experience.
(2) IQ
CIT,
Formula (2) simply indicates that conceptualizer C carries out conceptualization Q at Oment T of processing time. Using this notation, we can now offer at least a partial representation of what happens when somebody mentally recites the alphabet:
(3) ||a b Χ у

... D D CT, LCT CIT, CITy4 CIT25
The import of (3) is that C first activates the conception of a, then that of b, and so on; C's recitation of the alphabet occupies span (T.T., T3 T26 of processing time. Observe that conceived time has no intrinsic role in this exercise; at any one moment, C's conception is merely that of some letter in the alphabet. Though C may be aware of the passage of time, and may even pay heed to his own participation in a temporally-extended activity, neither sort of awareness is
C T26
Basic concepts and assumptions 151
inherent in the recitation task perse.
Despite its subtlety, this matter of self-awareness is rich with implications for both semantic and grammatical structure (cf. Langacker 1985), and since it is central to our later concerns, we must find a way of dealing with it. It is helpful to start from the ideal (and possibly nonexistent) situation in which the conceptualizer manifests a total lack of self-awareness: C is completely absorbed in the conception of O, to the extent that he loses all awareness of himself, and even of the fact that he is engaging in the conceptualization process (i.e. what C conceptualizes is simply Q, and not at all C conceptualizing Q). With respect to this idealized situation, I will say that the role of C is fully 'subjective', whereas that of Q is "'objective'. Full subjectivity and objectivity thus stand in polar opposition, being defined for instances involving maximal asymmetry between the roles of conceptualizer and object of conceptualization. In practice, of course, the roles are commonly mixed, as the conceptualizer himself is often an object of conceptualization. To the extent that C creeps into the conceptualization, the Subjectivity of his role declines; when C indulges his notorious egocentricity, and makes himself the focus of attention within Q, the basis for the subjective/objective distinction is eroded entirely.
The alphabet once more provides convenient illustration. Formula (3) represents the situation where C is totally absorbed in mentally reciting the alphabet and loses all self-awareness; the letters of the alphabet are thus fully objective entities (as I am using that term here), while C's role is maximally subjective. Suppose, on the other hand, that C not only mentally recites the alphabet, but also consciously monitors his facility and accuracy in doing so-in this case, C conceptualizes not only the alphabet (letter by letter), but also C conceptualizing the alphabet. There are consequently two levels of conceptualization:
(4) Ia b Z
D l, D ... D راCI
C’ T C T2 C’ T C’ T26
Since all of (3) now functions as an object of conceptualization, it is embedded as Such in a higher-order construal relation. Note that there are two conceptualizer roles, one for each level of organization: the conceptualizer's role in mentally reciting the alphabet (indicated by C), and his role in the self-monitoring of this process (indicated by C).
Because C is the object of self-observation in (4), this role is no longer a Subjective one. Moreover, the processing time required for C to run through the alphabet qualifies as conceived time from the perspective of C, and is thus represented t1. 26ا و... او را[ . Role C, by contrast, is purely subjective (provided

152 Abstract motion
that the conceptualizer does not add yet another layer of conceptualization by thinking about the fact that he is monitoring his recitation). Formula (4) can also be applied to the situation where C and C are different individuals, which would be the case if C were to imagine somebody else reciting the alphabet. The status of C in this situation depends on whose viewpoint is considered: from the standpoint of C, C is fully objective; from his own vantage point, however, C is simply running through the alphabet (without self-awareness), and is therefore subjectively construed.
2. The characterization of verbs
It was argued in Chapter 3 that a verb designates a complex relation, i.e. its profile comprises a continuous series of component states, each of which--taken individually-constitutes a simple, stative relation. How, then, does a verb differ from a preposition that describes a path (as opposed to a single, static location)? What is the difference, for example, between the verb cross in (5a) and the preposition across in (5b)?
(5) a. A black dog crossed the field.
b. A black dog walked across the field.
It cannot merely be that the verb's component states are distributed through a continuous span of conceived ye for the same could be said of the preposition (see Figure 9(b) of Chapter 1). I have therefore suggested that the difference perhaps does not lie in the conceptual content of the expressions, but rather in how this content is accessed.
My working hypothesis is that the difference between verbs and other complex relations is attributable to certain mental abilities that are both independently established and introspectively apparent. Suppose that somebody throws a ball, and that I watch it sail through the air. The flight of the ball represents a complex relation, as defined above: with the passage of time the ball occupies a series of distinct locations constituting a spatial path; the relationship of the ball to its surroundings does not reduce to a single consistent configuration (state). Now in observing this event, I may simply follow the ball's flight from its starting point to its destination, so that my conception at any one instant is focused on the momentary position of the ball in relation to its position an instant before. This mode of viewing an event constitutes sequential scanning--the states comprising the event are accessed in sequence, and the conception representing any one state is only momentary. However, I also have the ability to construe the process more holistically, either while watching it or during a mental 'replay'. I can pay specific attention to the ball's trajectory, seeing its trajectory 'grow' from instant to instant as the ball sails along its path; at the end, I have built up a conception of
The characterization of verbs 153
the full trajectory that functions as a single gestalt and is manipulable as a simultaneously available whole (e.g. I can observe its shape and assess its degree of curvature). The term summary scanning refers to this second mode of tracking an event. The states comprising the event are still accessed in sequence, but once activated the conception corresponding to a given state remains active throughout. Thus the full conception grows progressively more complex, the end result being the simultaneous activation and accessibility of all the component states.
The notations previously introduced are capable of representing the difference between sequential and Summary scanning. Consider the conception of an object falling to the ground, as diagramed in Figure 4(a) of Chapter 3. Only four component states are explicitly show, (labeled a, b, c, and d), but they stand for what is actually a continuous series. The sequential scanning of this complex relation can be formulated as follows:
(6) a b C d
D D
C T 2 C T C 4
At moment T of processing time, the conceptualizer activates the conception of state a; at T., he activates conception b; and so on. Observe that each conception begins to decay as the next one is activated, so that only one is fully active at any one instance. In summary Scanning, by contrast, each state remains active as the next one in the series is accessed:
(7) a a > | lb
CT
1
C
C
T4
The resulting conception grows progressively more complex, so that finally (at T4) all the component states are superimposed and simultaneously active (see Chapter 3, Figure 4(b)). The directionality in this conception is due to the order in which the states are activated in building up to it.
The proposal advanced in Chapter 3 was that the difference between verbs and other complex relations is plausibly characterized in terms of sequential vs. summary scanning. Even if members of the two classes comprise the same series of states and thus have the same conceptual content, they differ in how this COಗ್ದಂಗ್ಲ! is construed with respect to its pattern of activation through processing time. A verb is said to profile a process: it scans sequentially through a complex relation whose component states are distributed continuously through a span of conceived time (referred to as the verb's temporal profile). Formula (8) is thus offered as a

154 Abstract motion
Semantic characterization considered valid for all members of the verb class, where r Stands for a stative relation, and |r;lt; indicates that relation r holds at point of conceived time.
(8) ||r|t| |r2]t2 |rzltz ["nlէn

... D.
C T C T C T3 C I
A verb profiles a complex relation r1, f2, r:3, ..., r extending through span lt 1, و (ا o e o n! of conceived time. The conceptualizer C (identifiable as the speaker وا and/or hearer) scans sequentially through this complex configuration during span IT, T2, T2 , ..., T of processing time.
tus further recall the distinction between perfective and imperfective verbs. Roughly speaking, perfective verbs take the progressive, as illustrated in (9), but normally do not occur in the simple present tense; imperfectives do occur in the simple present, as in (10), but resist the progressive.
(9) a. My neighbor is washing his car again. b. The coach is screaming at his players. c. A young couple was walking along the beach.
(10) a. I know that she understands the difficulty.
b. Alice definitely likes tuna. c. Phil believes that Jason resembles his father.
In a perfective, the component states constitute a bounded series, and generally they involve some change through time (i.e. there are adjacent states in the Sequence where r + r. -- 1). By contrast, imperfectives are not specifically bounded, and all the component states are construed as being identical. Formula (8) can be revised as follows to highlight the characteristic properties of imperfectives:
(11) [R]t [R]"; [R]tk
... D D D > ...
С ШТ. CIT, C Tk
Formula (11) represents the special case of (8) in which no initial or final state is distinguished, and where r = r throughout. An imperfective thus tracks through conceived time (by means of sequential scanning) the continuation of a Stable situation, given as R in the formula.
Objective motion 155
3. Objective motion
We are now ready to consider verbs of physical motion, such as trudge, walk, swim, climb, roll, etc. The only facet of their meaning that directly concerns us is the mover's spatial trajectory; we may ignore such factors as the method and rate of locomotion. For our purposes, then, a motion verb can be regarded as a special sort of perfective process, namely one in which each component state specifies the relation between the mover and his immediate location. Starting from formula (8), we can therefore obtain the representation for a verb of spatial movement by substituting for each instance of rii the more specific notation Im]], which indicates that the mover m occupies location li:
(12) |[[mllilt |[[mllշlւշ [[mllnlւր
D > ... D C
C C IT
1 2
Thus, m occupies location lI at moment t; he occupies l at 2; and so on. Through Span (t, to, t, ..., til of conceivပf time, the mover traverses the spatial path (l, lo, وا o mل: Formula (12) is highly schematic and expresses what all verbs O pfysိhl motion have in common. The meaning of go may well be limited to this schematic content when it functions as a maximally generic motion verb.
Consider now some uses of go that do not pertain to spatial motion:
(13) a. Roger went through the alphabet in 7.3 seconds.
b. This milk is about to go sour. c. The concert went from midnight to 4AM.
Though one's first thought is to treat such sentences as instances of spatial metaphor, it is not obvious to me how strongly or consistently speakers perceive them as such; moreover, to describe a metaphor we must in any case characterize both the source and the target domains, together with the mapping between them (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Langacker 1987a, chapter 4). One way or another, we must therefore attribute to go a conventionally established range of values that indicate change in nonspatial domains.
Actually, there is no need to alter formula (12) to accommodate such examples --we need only interpret the notations in a suitably abstract manner. Under this generalized interpretation, 11, 12 و (ا, ......., n is not to be construed as a spatial path in particular, but simply as an ordered sequence of entities within the relevant domain, such that the 'mover' m is capable of 'making contact with each of these entities individually; Iml, then indicates the momentary contact of m with l; in this domain. The notions entity and contact are admittedly vague, but their intended application to the present examples is reasonably straightforward: in (13a), the entities are letters of the alphabet, and Roger makes contact with a given

156 Abstract motion
letter by reciting it; in (13b), the entities are points along a scale for evaluating freshness/sourness, and the milk makes contact with such an entity by being fresh or sour to a specific degree; in (13c), the entities are points in conceived time, and the concert makes contact with a point when its duration extends to include it. What we have done, in effect, is to characterize a maximally schematic concept of motion, with respect to which physical movement through space is just a special case (though clearly prototypical). Let us speak of 'abstract motion'' when this schematic conception is applied to nonspatial domains, as in (13). Formula (14) thus describes the abstract motion of somebody going through the alphabet: the mover first recites the letter a at moment t I (this is represented formulaically as IImlalt), then the letter batt, and So on.
(14) I(mlalt Imb) I(mlzlt26

... D
C T C 2 C 26
For Our later purposes, example (13c) holds particular significance. The concert
is an abstract mover, making contact with an ordered series of points in time as its
duration extends. The formulaic representation of this abstract motion is (15),
which is exactly parallel to (14) except that the abstract path of motion is the temporal sequence t1. وا و (ا e - a 'nl rather than the letters of the alphabet.
D . . . >
C T2 C Tn
(15) |[[m|tilt [[mlւnlւր
D
C T
Observe that conceived time plays two distinct roles in (15). One is the role it has in any process, as defined in (8): the component states of the process are distributed through a continuous span of conceived time (and scanned sequentially through processing time). Its other role pertains to the internal structure of the component states: time serves as the cognitive domain with respect to which the profiled relation is characterized, and is thus analogous to space in verbs of physical motion, or the alphabet in (13a). Since the same span of conceived time is involved in both roles, it is perhaps superfluous to indicate t twice at each stage, [[ml:lt: could perfectly well be collapsed to Imlt. Still, it is important to emphasize this dual role and the parallelism of (13c) to other motion predications. The only thing special about this example is that conceived time is itself the domain in which the profiled relation manifests itself.
A possible objection at this juncture is that the definition of abstract motion is so general that any change whatever could be construed as an instance. If So, I am inclined to believe that this consequence might be appropriate rather than unfortunate, for it is not at all obvious that change and motion are ever Strongly dissociated in our conceptual world. It would be interesting in this regard to see if
Objective motion 157
there are cases in which a verb meaning 'go evolves into a pro-verb for the class of perfective processes, or conversely (see Langacker 1981 for a possible example).
4. Subjective motion
A perfective motion verb profiles change through time in the spatial location of the mover. There are also verbs that A perfective motion verb profiles change through time in the spatial location of the mover. There are also verbs that the plaza.
b. The United States lies between Mexico and Canada.
Here stand and lie are imperfective, i.e. they profile the continuation through time of a stable situation. In (11), the general formula for imperfective processes, the profiled relation scanned sequentially through conceived time was represented by R. To accommodate the special case where the profiled relation is locative, we need only substitute for R the more specific notation IMIL, indicating that entity M occupies location L:
(17) MLt. (MJL), MLt
... D > D > ...
C i C T C Tk
Though M does not move, it is analogous to a mover in being the entity whose location is specified. Observe that C’s conception at any one instant is of the form IIM/L/: which is basically the same as it is in the case of motion verbs, namely [[mll;lt; (cf. (12)). What distinguishes the two types of verbs is whether the locative specification differs from one state to the next, or remains constant throughout.
Consider now the following pairs of sentences:
(18) a. The roof slopes steeply upward.
b. The roof slopes steeply downward.
(19) a. The hill gently rises from the bank of the river.
b. The hill gently falls to the bank of the river.
(20) a. This highway goes from Tijuana to Ensenada. b. This highway goes from Ensenada to Tijuana.
Like the ones in (16), these sentences describe stable situations in which nothing is portrayed as moving or otherwise changing. The felicity of the simple present

158 Abstract motion
tense confirms their analysis as imperfective processes: each profiles a single, constant configuration and follows its continuation through conceived time. Obviously, though, something more is going on. In (18)-(20) there is in each instance a clear semantic contrast between the two examples that cannot be attributed to objective properties of the profiled configuration, since precisely the same configuration is designated by the members of each pair. Intuitively, it seems evident that these sentences incorporate a sense of directionality that is lacking in (16)-each pair of sentences contrast semantically because they imply opposite directions. But how can we meaningfully speak of directionality when nothing moves or changes?
This is another instance where a semantic contrast does not reside in the conceptual content of two expressions, but rather in how that content is accessed (recall cross vs. across). For instance, (18a) and (18b) describe precisely the same situation pertaining to the spatial orientation of the roof, and both portray this situation as extending through conceived time without essential change; in this sense their conceptual content is identical. However, the profiled spatial configuration has a certain degree of internal complexity, because M (the roof) is itself an elongated, path-like object. We can reasonably suppose that the conception of such a configuration requires a certain span of processing time for its full activation: rather than springing instantaneously into full-blown existence, the conception might be built up incrementally, with all facets of it being active only at the conclusion of this 'build-up phase'. If so, the directionality we perceive in such sentences is attributable to the order in which the various facets of the configuration are activated. Moreover, since different orders of activation can lead to the same overall configuration, we have a way of accounting for the semantic COIntraSt.
In Figure 1, I have sketched the overall locative configuration IMIL whose continuation through conceived time is profiled by the sentences in (18). The domain for this conception is oriented space, i.e. space organized into the horizontal and vertical axes. The roof, M, is an elongated object whose alignment with respect to these axes is being assessed. Let us refer to the points along the spatial extension of M as [m1, m2, m3 ..., Πηl: in the diagram, m is equated with the roof's lower extremity, and m with its upper extremity. Each point m along the roof's extension occupies location l; in oriented Space, l reduces to the combination (h., v), where h is the horizontal projection of m, and v. its vertical projection. L, the spatial location of M, therefore does not consist of a single point, but rather the path-like set of points (11. り。 3. e o nl.
Subjective motion 159
Figure 1.
I am assuming that every conception involving directionality at the experiential level implies some kind of seriality at the processing level. The directionality in (18) is attributed to the build-up phase leading to the full activation of configuration IMIL. For (18a), we may posit the following sequence of activation:
(21) [milli [milli [m]||11 m l
D Im)) D (m2)12 > ... D. Im2 !2 C l ]mوالو ]mوالم
C 2
C T
[mոlln
C T
I
That is, in building up to the full conception, C first activates Subconfiguration In IlI then Imall , and so on. Summary Scanning is employed, so once initiated each subconfiguration remains active throughout; as a consequence, the conception grows progressively more complex with the passage of processing time, until the full configuration IMIL is simultaneously active at T Experientially, it is as if the roof 'grows upward' starting from its lower extremity m eventually reaching its full extension. The analysis of (18b) is identical except that m is equated with the roof's upper extremity, and m with its lower end. The sequence in (21) is then manifested experientially as the roof 'growing downward' from top to bottom. But either sequence of activation results in the same overall configuration IMIL, whose extension through conceived time plays no inherent role in the build-up phase, as IMIL itself is atemporal. The perceived directionality of (18) derives instead from the Order in which its subconfigurations are accessed through processing time.
We can of course speak of motion in sentences like (18), but motion of a special

160 Abstract motion
sort. As M 'grows' upward or downward from its starting point, its leading edge can be thought of as moving through space in much the same way that the concert moves through time in (13c). However, as (21) shows, the position of M's leading edge changes only through processing time, not through conceived time; only by taking into account the time axis of the construal relation itself do we obtain the temporal component necessary for considering this to be a type of motion. Once we invoke processing time in this fashion, additional instances of motion can be discerned in (21). For these latter, the mover is not M, but rather C.
The conceptualizer can be thought of as moving along either of two paths: m, ml (= M), or 11, り。 3. In (= L). This motion on the part of C is و... ,m3 وm2 both aဂိstract and subjective, as these terms were defined earlier. Let us focus on M (the case of L is exactly parallel). C's conception of M counts as an instance of abstract motion according to the following rationale: (i) [m1, m2, m3, ..., m constitute an ordered set of entities; (ii) during the build-up phase, Caccesses these entities in sequence, i.e. he first activates the conception of m I then that of т2, and so on; (iii) by activating the conception of a particular entity m C can be regarded as making contact with it mentally (just as one makes contact with the letters of the alphabet by reciting them-cf. (13a)); and (iv) each such contact occurs at a distinct point in (processing) time. We need only restate these interactions in the format IICIm/T to see that they qualify as an instance of abstract motion, with C as the mover.
C's motion in (21) is not only abstract but also subjective. The reason, quite simply, is that C does not conceive of himself as moving along a path: as (21) clearly reveals, C's conception at any instant is limited to some portion of the locative relationship IMIL, and his own role in this relation is purely subjective. It is only from the external perspective of the analyst that C moves abstractly along a path. Barring self-analysis (where C would play a dual role, as in (4)), the conception that Chimself entertains is merely the directional construal of a static configuration.
5. Avenues of semantic extension
The sentences in (19), (20), and (22) illustrate a common type of semantic extension:
(22) A white fence (runs/stretches/reaches/extends from one end of his
property to the other.
In each case, a perfective verb of physical movement has developed an additional, imperfective value in which it describes the continuation through time of a static configuration. The conception of motion has not disappeared entirely, however, a shadow of it remains in the directionality with which the static configuration is
Avenues of semantic extension 161
construed, as characterized in (21). Whereas the basic meaning profiles physical motion by an objectively-construed mover (namely the subject), one (unprofiled) facet of the extended meaning is abstract motion by a subjectively-construed mover, specifically the conceptualizer. The pivotal factor in this type of Semantic shift is therefore 'subjectification'': an originally objective notion is transferred to the subjective axis of the construal relation itself.
A second common avenue of semantic extension is for the profile of a complex relation to be restricted to its final state; the extended meaning then constitutes a stative relation. The prepositions in (23) represent complex relations--each of them profiles a series of states that do not reduce to a single, consistent configuration.
(23) a. The prisoner ran to the fence.
b. Abernathy crawled through the tunnel. c. The scouts hiked over the mountain.
The corresponding stative relations are illustrated in (24). Each preposition profiles only a single locative configuration, but one that is construed as the last in a series of configurations defining an extended spatial path.
(24) a. The prisoner is already to the fence.
b. Abernathy must be through the tunnel by now. c. The scouts were over the mountain by noon.
The profile of a complex relation is similarly restricted to its final state in the case of adjectival past participles (e.g. swollen designates the final state of the process swell); here, of course, the relationship involves derivation rather than Semantic extension.
Consider now the following sentences:
(25) a. A stray dog walked across the plaza, through the alley, and Over
the bridge. b. The Linguistics Hall of Fame is across the plaza, through the alley,
and over the bridge.
Both incorporate the complex locative expression across the plaza, through the alley, and over the bridge, which describes an extended spatial path. Since (25a) profiles spatial motion by an objectively-construed mover, the occurrence of Such a locative is quite natural. Why, however, should a path locative appear in (25b), which does not describe motion at all, but only the static, point-like location of its subject?
My proposal is that the locative in (25b) receives a special interpretation that combines the two types of semantic extension previously discussed. The normal

162 Abstract motion
value of a path locative, corresponding to the objective spatial motion of (25a), is depicted in Figure 2(a): with the passage of conceived time, the objective mover (i.e. the subject) occupies successively all those points that constitute the extended spatial path (indicated by the dashed arrow). The effect of subjectification is to replace the objective spatial motion of the subject with abstract, subjective motion on the part of C in building up to his conception of a stable objective configuration. We observed this effect in (18)-(20), and we observe it again in (25b). The difference between the two cases resides in whether or not the second type of semantic extension-profile restriction--also applies. It does not apply in (18)-(20), where the profiled objective configuration essentially 'telescopes' all the component states of Figure 2(a); the subject is an elongated entity (a roof, hill, or highway) that simultaneously occupies all the points along the extended spatial path. In (25b), by contrast, the subject occupies only the endpoint of the path, corresponding to just the final state of Figure 2(a), we obtain this result by applying both profile restriction and subjectification to the basic meaning. The product of these two semantic extensions, as applied to Figure 2(a), is thus the structure represented in 2(b). Through time, the subject is stably located at the endpoint of a path anchored at the other end by the position of C, whose abstract and subjective motion along this path allows him to compute the location of the subject relative to his own.
(a) t Q Q Q
C) || ||
| | | | | |0|0
ܓܠ سے
Q d
Q d)
ܟܠ
"تی
Figure 2.
Finally, let us consider sentences in which a finite motion verb takes an infinitival complement (see Lamiroy 1983 for insightful discussion):
(26) a. Il montese coucher. He is going up to go to bed'
b. Il court le regarder. Heis running to look at it'
Semantically, it is specified that the subject traverses a spatial path, at the end of which he initiates the process indicated by the infinitival complement. Formally, these sentences are precisely parallel to those in which a verb meaning "go" comes to indicate futurity. Thus, while (27) might be construed as indicating spatial
Avenues of semantic extension 163
motion that terminates in the process of door-opening, it is far more likely to be interpreted as a "gonna'-type future, just as in the English translation:
(27) Il va ouvrir la porte. He is going to open the door'
This example brings us back to our original question: What is the proper way of describing the common semantic extension from "go" to 'future'?
To account for this development, we need only combine the two avenues of Semantic extension just considered with a third one that is massively attested in natural language: the application of a spatial term to the temporal domain (recall the discussion of (13c)). The extension from "go" to “future' is therefore captured by the difference between Figures 2(a) and 20b), provided that the path of motion is interpreted as being spatial in the former and temporal in the latter. With the path construed as a spatial one, Figure 2(a) represents the movement sense of (27); at the endpoint of his motion, the subject initiates the process specified by the infinitival complement. With the path construed as a temporal one, Figure 2(b) represents the futurity sense of (27). Under this interpretation, (27) profiles the continuation through time of a stable configuration whose domain also happens to be that of conceived time. What is this temporal configuration? It is one in which the subject's initiation of the infinitival process lies downstream in time from the location of the conceptualizer, since C is the speaker and/or hearer, C's location is the time of the speech event. Moreover, C computes the position of the infinitival process relative to his own (the time of speaking) by sequentially activating, during the build-up phase, his conception of the temporal path linking the two.
In sum, it is not the subject who moves through time when a sentence like (27) indicates futurity, but rather the conceptualizer, whose motion is both subjective and abstract. It is argued in Chapter 12 that subjectification, as witnessed by the shift from "go" to "future', is a recurrent factor in the semantic attenuation that accompanies grammaticization.